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Abstract
We show that the discontinuity in the distribution of surveyed female income
shares at the margin where a woman would outearn her partner is primarily driven
by norm induced misreporting in surveys. We draw on unique Swiss data combining
survey and administrative information for the same individual and their partner.
We demonstrate that individuals misreport incomes in surveys to comply with the
male breadwinner norm. The male breadwinner norm does, however, not affect real
labor market decisions around this margin. The resulting survey bias leads to a
considerable overestimation of policy relevant measures like the gender wage gap.
Keywords : gender norms, female income shares, combination survey and administra-
tive data, income misreporting, gender earnings gap
JEL classifications: D10, J01, J16
†University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics, Peter Merian-Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland.
Phone: +41 (0)61 207 33 14, email: anja.roth@unibas.ch.
‡University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics, Peter Merian-Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland.
ZEW – Centre for European Economic Research, L7,1, 68161 Mannheim, Germany.
Phone: +41 (0)61 207 33 75, email: michaela.slotwinski@unibas.ch.
Michaela Slotwinski gratefully acknowledges financial support from the NCCR on the move financed by
the Swiss National Science Foundation. We are grateful to the FSO, and particularly to Jonas Deplazes,
for supporting our research and enabling us to connect the survey and the administrative information. We
are further grateful to Felipe Carozzi, Marius Faber, Olle Folke, Patricia Funk, Matthias Krapf, Armando
Meier, Georg Nöldeke, Reto Odermatt, Marcus Roller, Kurt Schmidheiny, Sebastian Siegloch, Sarah
Smith, Alois Stutzer, Daniel Waldenström, and Conny Wunsch and the many seminar and conference
participants for helpful comments.
1
1 Introduction
Women’s lives have become more emancipated and empowered over the last century
(Goldin, 2006). At the same time, there is still ample evidence that differences in the
ascribed gender roles are deeply grounded and strikingly persistent, and that these dif-
ferences play an important role in shaping individuals’ outcomes (see, e.g., Alesina et al.,
2013; Teso, 2019; Giuliano, 2017). In recent years, economists have been striving to un-
derstand the extent to which these gender norms impact economic agents’ behavior (see,
e.g., Alesina et al., 2013; Fernández et al., 2004; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Fortin, 2005;
Teso, 2019).
In a prominent contribution, Bertrand et al. (2015) document a striking discontinuity
in the distribution of female income shares, measured as female incomes as a share of
couple income. This discontinuity is located right at the point at which a woman would
outearn her partner. There is sharp bunching in female income shares just below 50
percent and missing mass above in US data. The observed statistical pattern is attributed
to the male breadwinner norm, which states that men are supposed to be the main earners
in a couple and which leads couples to sort to below the threshold to comply with this
norm. This study has motivated a whole literature trying to explain the discontinuity
and to find the mechanisms behind it, mostly focusing on real behavior. In addition to
couple formation and women actively adapting their labor market outcomes in order to
not outearn their partner, various drivers unrelated to gender norms have been proposed,
such as the tax schedule or collective wage agreements (see, e.g., Wieber and Holst, 2015;
Lippmann et al., 2019; Binder and Lam, 2018; Eriksson and Stenberg, 2015; Zinovyeva
and Tverdostup, 2018). However, there is still dissent on the exact mechanisms and on
whether gender norms are indeed involved.
In this paper, we present a different behavioral channel which has thus far not been
considered: We show that misreporting of incomes in surveys can account for the largest
part of the discontinuity in female income shares in Switzerland.1 Merging individual
level Swiss administrative and survey data, we are able to precisely capture the differences
between the surveyed and administrative earnings. Our results reinforce gender norms as
the primary driver behind the discontinuity in the distribution of female income shares
based on survey data, as there are no incentives other than norms to misreport incomes
in a survey. Our findings suggest that these gender norms might, however, not affect real
behavior as strongly as previously thought.
First, we show that the distribution of female income shares in survey data features a
sharp drop of about 75 percent at the threshold where a woman would outearn her partner,
1Gil and Mora (2011), for example, document that social norms play a role in the misreporting
of individuals’ weight. Martinelli and Parker (2009) relatedly find that misreporting in self-reported
program eligibility surveys is not only driven by underreporting due to material incentives, but also
by overreporting of goods with ‘status’ value. Hariri and Lassen (2017) document that there is social
desirability bias in income reporting of high income groups in Denmark. Furthermore, Funk (2016)
documents for Switzerland that socially acceptable norms are an important driver of responses to post-
vote surveys.
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which is in line with prior studies for other countries. Second, using administrative data
of all married couples in Switzerland, we document that the discontinuity prevails but
is about 75 percent smaller (about 20 percent). This eliminates the possibility that the
observed discontinuity is purely driven by institutional factors or real responses in the
Swiss case and substantiates the suspicion that the largest part is a result of survey
responses.
In order to examine misreporting of incomes in surveys as the mechanism behind
this differential, we retained the administrative income of survey respondents and their
partners for a sub-sample of the survey population. Based on this data, we show that
the excess mass below the threshold in survey data is composed of individuals whose
administrative income share lies above the threshold, who thus misreport incomes to
comply with traditional gender norms. Individuals misreport both their own as well as
their partner’s income in order to adhere to traditional gender norms and place the couple
below the threshold where the woman would outearn her partner. We further observe that
individuals just below the threshold preemptively react to the norm and start to adapt
their income reporting such that they do not violate the male breadwinner norm. This
speaks against an equality norm argument, which would state that a couple’s goal is to
state equal earnings in surveys.
Descriptive statistics are in line with traditional gender norms being a major driver
of this behavior. Focusing on couples where the woman outearns the partner based on
administrative information, we find that the probability that the respondent reports a
surveyed female income share below or equal to 50 percent is higher if the man is more
or equally educated. Consistently, misreporting is more likely if the woman works the
same or fewer hours but still outearns her partner. This is in line with the reasoning
that situations which might pose a threat to the male identity lead to misreporting. Fur-
thermore, misreporting is more prevalent for individuals from gender unequal countries,
for German speaking individuals (compared to non-German speaking individuals), and
in couples with a higher within-couple age difference; all measures frequently related to
more traditional gender norms.
Our finding that individuals’ responses in surveys are strongly affected by gender
norms reveals that a large part of the discontinuity in female income shares based on
survey data is due to systematic income misreporting. However, it also has broader
implications. Survey data are widely used in economics and social sciences, e.g., for
studies on the gender wage gap (GWG), unemployment rates, and other statistics used
by economists and policy makers. If, as for example in our case, women’s incomes are
systematically underreported and those of men systematically overreported due to gender
norm considerations, this creates an upward bias in estimates of the GWG based on
survey information. As survey participants tend to also systematically misreport partner
incomes, the problem is amplified if the survey sample is enriched by proxy interviews,
which is frequently the case to reduce survey costs (Reynolds and Wenger, 2012; Lee and
Lee, 2012). For instance, proxy interviews constitute almost 50 percent of the Current
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Population Survey, the most widely used data source of the US Department of Labor. In
our data, the use of surveyed incomes results in an 9.4 percent overestimation and the
additional use of proxy information to a 13.5 percent overestimation of the true GWG as
measured in the administrative data. This underscores the importance of learning more
about social norms and potential biases in survey data when studying sensitive questions.
Empirical evidence on the distribution of female income shares is in line with the
result that misreporting in surveys plays an important role: Studies using survey data
find more distinct discontinuities than studies using administrative data. Wieber and
Holst (2015) and Sprengholz et al. (2019) find a strong discontinuity in the distribution
of surveyed female income shares in Germany of roughly 60 percent, i.e., the mass just
above the threshold is 60 percent lower than the mass just below. Bertrand et al. (2015)
themselves use a mix of survey and administrative data for their analysis. They clearly
note that there is a much larger mass of couples earning the exact same income in survey
data than in administrative data and distribute the excess mass at 50 percent in surveyed
female income shares to the neighbouring bins.2 Using the same data base, Binder and
Lam (2018) show that there is a discontinuity of about 12.4 percent in US administrative
data. Other studies relying on administrative data also find that the discontinuity is
less distinct (Eriksson and Stenberg (2015), 22.5 percent in Sweden and Zinovyeva and
Tverdostup (2018) 11.3 percent in Finland). Using administrative data Eriksson and
Stenberg (2015), and Zinovyeva and Tverdostup (2018) show that the spike at the point
where spouses earn the exact same income consists mainly of couples working in the same
sector or for the same employer, and argue that the discontinuity at the point where the
woman outearns her partner is therefore not related to traditional gender norms. Rather,
the spike at the point where spouses earn the exact same income might reflect a country’s
institutional framework, e.g., collective agreements, minimum wages, or a progressive
income tax schedule with individual taxation, which amplify incentives for couples to
bunch at exactly 50 percent. This would be reflected in a large spike at this point of the
distribution, which would produce a discontinuity in both survey and administrative data
and which is unrelated to traditional gender norms.
Descriptive evidence for the US is in line with the hypothesis that misreporting might
play a role. Murray-Close and Heggeness (2018) find that the deviation between surveyed
and administrative incomes is higher in couples where the woman earns more than her hus-
band than in couples where the woman earns less than her husband. While their findings
are interesting, they remain descriptive and cannot contribute to explaining the bunching
below the point where the woman outearns her partner, as they compare the average of
2More specifically, they attribute the difference in mass at 50 percent between the distribution based on
administrative and on survey data partly to top-coding and imputing of incomes and drop these couples
from the analysis. They ascribe the remaining differential between survey and administrative data to
rounding and misreporting and randomly distribute the remaining mass differential to the neighboring
bins.
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all couples below and above the threshold.3 Bursztyn et al. (2017) similarly document
that single women tend to underreport their career ambitions in situations where social
norms become salient, i.e., if classmates are more likely to observe the response and larger
marriage market consequences can be expected.
We document that misreporting in surveys to conform with the male breadwinner
norm causes the largest part of the discontinuity found in survey data and explains why it
is not fully reflected in the distribution of female income shares based on administrative
data. This explanation reconciles the results of prior studies and draws attention to a
systematic bias in surveyed incomes. The question whether systematic misreporting of
incomes is equally prevalent in other countries is up for future research. However, our
evidence clearly reveals that potential survey biases have to be considered when working
with survey items that are prone to be distorted by social norms. Such biases can have
far reaching consequences for policy relevant measures like the GWG. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that the combination of survey and administrative data may be a novel
approach to measuring norms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data
for our main analysis before Section 3.1 presents the results for the overall distribution
of female income shares, once based on survey and once based on administrative data.
Section 3.2 presents a detailed analysis of individuals’ misreporting of their own and
their partner’s incomes for couples where the woman earns more based on administrative
information. Section 3.3 presents some descriptive evidence on characteristics correlated
with misreporting. Section 4 discusses and quantifies broader implications of the resulting
survey bias for a frequently used policy measure, the GWG. Section 5 offers concluding
remarks.
2 Data
Our main analysis draws on data of the largest Swiss labor market survey (Schweizerische
Arbeitskräftererhebung, SAKE) from survey years 2012 and 2015. In these years, the
special questionnaire ‘Social Security’ including questions about partner income was ad-
ministered in addition to the basic questionnaire eliciting respondents’ incomes. The
survey is based on telephone interviews where the respondent within a household is ran-
domly chosen.4 The information from survey interviews allows us to calculate the surveyed
female income share. Furthermore, we were able to retrieve the respondent’s as well as his
or her partner’s administrative income based on the Swiss Central Compensation Office
3They use the full range of female income shares for their analyses and their results seem to be
driven by individuals in the top and bottom quantile of the earnings’ distribution. Also, the selection of
women who outearn their husbands show very different characteristics in terms of their administrative
income, education level, age, and number of children, to name a few. It thus remains unclear whether
the differences found by Murray-Close and Heggeness (2018) are related to traditional gender norms or
whether they simply reflect the different selection of individuals.
4More information on the exact interview process can be found in Appendix A.5.
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(ZAS) for the same years.5,6 Observing administrative and surveyed incomes for both the
survey respondent and the partner gives us the opportunity to study misreporting of ones
own and the partner’s incomes, as well as the difference between the administrative and
the survey based female income share.
Our sample consists of respondents with Swiss citizenship or permanent residence
permit, and where both partners are in paid employment.7 Survey income can be stated
as either hourly, monthly, or yearly gross or net income.8 The category most commonly
chosen is monthly gross income, picked by 36 percent of individuals. In order to avoid
biases from approximations, we focus on individuals who report both their own as well as
their partner’s income in the same mode (monthly net, monthly gross, or yearly gross),
which is true for about 74 percent of our couples.9 We use the survey information of
those individuals who we believe are most likely to be able to report their own and their
partner’s income correctly. We therefore restrict the sample to individuals employed in
the twelve months prior to the interview. We exclude all individuals who work shift since
part of their income can vary from month to month. We exclude couples where any one
partner is self-employed as administrative income may be distributed between partners
such that taxes are minimized. We further exclude all same sex couples and interviews
where the randomly chosen respondent within the household was not available, as well
as couples where one or both partners are above the retirement age of 65. Finally, we
exclude all couples where we observe a deviation between administrative and surveyed
incomes of more than 100 percent, which is true for 44 respondents when it comes to their
partner’s income and 29 respondents when it comes to their own income.10
5Linking survey respondents’ partners to registers has only technically been feasible since 2010. Survey
information on the partner’s income is only surveyed as part of a special questionnaire, which, since 2010,
has only been administered in 2012 and 2015. The years 2012 and 2015 are therefore the only years for
which we have both surveyed and administrative income information for both the respondent and his or
her partner.
6The respective incomes in the social security register are third party reported and there is thus no
scope for misreporting.
7Foreigners with temporary residence permit are exposed to a special tax scheme, which among other
things entails taxation at the source: In contrast to foreigners with a permanent residence permit and
Swiss citizens, taxes are withheld. They might thus report their income differently, as their wage statement
entails systematically different positions (see, e.g., Schmidheiny and Slotwinski, 2018).
8In Switzerland, the difference between gross and net income amounts to approximately 11 percent
and consists of contributions to social insurances and pension payments, which are directly deducted by
the employer. Except for foreigners with a temporary residence permit, taxes are paid by the individual
directly. Net income therefore refers to income after social security and pension payments, but before
taxes. Consequently, we observe a baseline underreporting of incomes of about 11 percent in our data
(see, e.g., the constant terms Table A.3).
9We convert yearly gross into monthly gross incomes by simply dividing yearly incomes by 12.
10We do this to exclude extreme cases where the individual reports completely unrealistic numbers in
the survey.
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The main variables of interest are:
• Survey income: Stated income of the survey respondent and of their partner, stated
by the surveyed individual.11
• Survey income share (RIsurvey): Income share of the woman in the couple based on
surveyed incomes. We define it as
[Survey inc. woman/(Survey inc. man + Survey inc. woman)]× 100.
• Administrative income: Survey respondent’s and partner’s actual earnings as recorded
in social insurance registers. The variable reports total monthly gross income from
employment in the month of the interview.
• Admin income share (RIadmin): Income share of the woman in the couple based on
administrative incomes of both partners. We define it as
[Admin inc. woman/(Admin inc. man + Admin inc. woman)]× 100.
• Income deviation: Deviation between survey income and administrative income for
the surveyed individual and the partner. It is defined as
[( Survey inc.− Administrative inc. )/Administrative inc.]× 100.12
3 Results
Our analysis is presented in three steps: First, we test for a discontinuity in the distribu-
tion of survey income shares based on five waves of the SAKE data, which are all available
waves in which partner incomes were levied. Subsequently, we test for the presence of
the same discontinuity in income shares based on administrative information of the whole
population of married couples. Second, we draw on our main sample for which we observe
the respondent’s and the partner’s surveyed and administrative incomes. This allows us
to calculate the surveyed and the administrative female income share for the same couple
and assess the extent to which the observed discontinuity can be explained by systematic
misreporting of one’s own and the partner’s income around the threshold. These data fur-
ther allow us to analyze the exact misreporting of couples where the woman outearns her
partner based on administrative information, but where the respondent places the couple
below the threshold or at the point where they both earn the same based on surveyed
incomes. We then explore descriptive statistics of misreporting couples. Third, we discuss
broader implications of our finding that there is systematic income misreporting due to
gender norms, demonstrating the consequences of the resulting survey bias for estimates
of the gender wage gap (GWG).
11The original questions are displayed in Appendix A.5.
12Only survey income reported as gross can directly be compared to administrative data. We control
for the fact that the income deviation between survey and administrative incomes should be larger when
income is reported as net by construction by adding an indicator variable for income reported as net in
all our estimations.
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Figure 1: Overall distribution of female income shares and LLD fit of the income share earned
by the woman in the couple. The solid line represents the LLD fit on both sides of the
threshold using a bandwidth of 7 percent. The shaded area represents the histogram of the
underlying data in 1 percent bins. The figure on the left visualizes the distribution observed in
survey data (based on SAKE survey years 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, and 2015). The figure on the
right shows the same distribution based on administrative income data for married couples
(this data are described in detail in Section A.2 in the appendix). The corresponding density
discontinuity estimates can be found in row (1) and row (4) of Table A.1 in Appendix A.4.
3.1 Distribution of female income shares
To test for a discontinuity just above 50 percent in the distribution of female income
shares based on survey data, we apply the empirical likelihood-based test by Otsu et al.
(2013). This approach has several advantages over the previously proposed approach by
McCrary (2008).13 In a nutshell, it estimates the discontinuity in separate local (linear)
likelihood density estimates (LLD) to both sides of the threshold. Consistently, for graph-
ical evidence, we plot two LLD estimates to both sides of the threshold of an income share
of women of just above 50 percent.14
For the analysis of pure survey responses, we are able to draw on a larger sample of
survey data, i.e., all SAKE waves where the question about partner incomes was asked
(years 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, and 2015).15 However, the link with the administrative
information required to analyze misreporting is only possible for the last two waves,
leaving us with data from 2012 and 2015 for the detailed analysis of misreporting.
The graph on the left of Figure 1 presents the overall distribution based on surveyed
incomes pooling male and female respondents. The distribution visually features a clear
13The approach by Otsu et al. (2013) shares the good boundary properties of the local linear estimate.
Additionally, the estimator is non-negative by construction, while the McCrary (2008) estimator can
produce negative density estimates. See Otsu et al. (2013) for more details about the approach.
14We use the local likelihood implementation (locfit) in the Chronux software package for Matlab
(Bokil et al., 2010) to fit LLDs to our data. As threshold we use the first observed value above 50
percent, indicated in the respective tables.
15In the years 2012 and 2015, the special questionnaire "Social Security" was only administered to two
third of individuals questioned in the first wave of the year, which corresponds to about one third of the
total sample.
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spike just below the margin where the woman outearns her partner and a clear disconti-
nuity. This suggests the presence of a discontinuity in the distribution of female income
shares at the point where the woman outearns her partner, just as in other countries
investigated in prior studies. We observe rather similar and systematic discontinuities
no matter if women or men are surveyed, as shown in Figure A.1 and Table A.1 in Ap-
pendix A.4.16
The overall discontinuity in the distribution based on survey data amounts to about
4 percentage points. The point estimate just below the threshold is about 4 times as
high as the estimate just above the threshold; or to put it differently, the mass drops by
about 75 percent at the threshold.17 The observed drop is very similar to the one found
in other studies using survey data (Wieber and Holst, 2015). As this bunching is a local
phenomenon, the relative size becomes even larger, about 9 or 88 percent, if we use half
the bandwidth, i.e., 3.5 percent (see Table A.2 in Appendix A.4).18
The graph on the right of Figure 1 presents the overall distribution based on pooled
administrative data for the whole Swiss population of married couples for the years 2010
to 2014. These data are based on the social security register for the whole population
and are described in more detail in Section A.2 in the appendix. The graph shows that
there is no pronounced spike just below the threshold in administrative data of the whole
population. The discontinuity estimates presented in row (4) of Table A.1 are much
smaller but remain significant. However, it must be noted that the sample size for this
calculation is huge. The drop only amounts to about 20 percent compared to the 75
percent found in survey data. This finding is in no way conclusive, since the population
differs between the two data sources and the distribution based on administrative data can
therefore not directly be compared to the distribution based on surveyed incomes. It still
shows that any discontinuity that might be driven by real responses or institutional factors
is magnitudes smaller than survey data would suggest. Bunching driven by institutional
factors or real responses would also appear in the administrative distribution.
Our main sample described above allows us to compare the surveyed income share
earned by the woman to the administrative female income share for the very same couple
and is composed of 3,081 observations.
In Figure 2, we compare the resulting distribution of surveyed female income shares
and administrative female income shares for the exact same sample of couples. As above,
we observe bunching of mass below the point where a women would outearn her partner
in the survey data. When plotting the distribution for the very same couples based on
administrative data, we do not observe any bunching below the 50 percent threshold.
16We choose the bandwidth to be 7 percent. The optimal bandwidth following McCrary (2008) would
be 12.89 and that proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2018) would be 5 percent. Table A.2 in the Appendix
repeats the density estimates for half the bandwidth, i.e., 3.5 percent.
17The conventional McCrary type approach is less precise would, however, lead to the same conclusions.
See Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
18This is simply because the incentives to bunch are the strongest around the threshold and we see an
exceptionally strong spike just below the threshold. Thus, if we reduce the bandwidth, these observations,
i.e., the spike, get more weight in the estimation and the estimated discontinuity increases.
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Figure 2: Pure survey and administrative distribution of female income shares for the very
same couples. The distributions are presented as raw histograms in 2 percent bins. The
corresponding density discontinuity estimates can be found in row (5) and row (6) of Table A.1
in Appendix A.4
This conclusion also holds for the discontinuity estimates: While the survey distribution
features a discontinuity just above 50 percent the administrative one does not (see row (5)
and row (6) of Table A.1).
The divergence between the surveyed and administrative distributions suggests that
the discontinuity in survey data is a survey artifact. The finding that bunching only
appears in the surveyed distribution further means that it is unrelated to any real re-
sponses to traditional gender norms around the threshold. In the following sections, we
analyze whether systematic income misreporting can explain this divergence between the
distribution of female income shares in surveyed and administrative incomes.
3.2 Misreporting of own and partner incomes
A violation of the male breadwinner norm entails a cost by contradicting individuals’ self-
perception. While real labor market adaptations are also costly, misreporting of actual
incomes allows survey respondents to comply with the male breadwinner norm and, at
the same time, maintain their self-image at a low cost (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). It
therefore allows individuals to resolve the cognitive dissonance of violating traditional
gender norms without bearing the costs they would incur if they adapted their labor
market behavior.
Such systematic misreporting would be reflected in women who earn more than their
partner underreporting their own and/or overreporting their partner’s income. If a woman
earning slightly more than her partner underreports her income such that it falls below
or equals her partner’s, this will result in two changes: First, the percentage difference
between surveyed and administrative income will increase in absolute terms. Second, since
the woman now reports she earns less than or the same as her partner, the couple will
find themselves below 50 percent in the distribution of surveyed female income shares. A
man whose partner earns just more and who wants to conform with the social norm that
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a woman should not earn more would, respectively, overreport his own income and/or
underreport his partner’s income. Such behavior would result in a strong selection of
individuals around the threshold in the distribution of female income shares based on
survey data. Those conforming with the norm by misreporting their own or their partner’s
income are placed below the threshold and those not conforming with the norm and who
therefore state that the woman earns more above the 50 percent margin in the distribution
of surveyed female income shares. This selection would be a consistent explanation for
the divergence between the administrative and the survey based distribution of female
income shares.
As we observe the position of couples in the distribution of female income shares
based on administrative information, we are able to identify those individuals who cross
the threshold with their survey response, i.e., couples where the woman outearns her
partner based on their administrative incomes but earns less or the same as her partner
according to the survey response (termed norm-complying misreporters in the following).
Figure 3 visualizes the correlation between the administrative female income share
(on the x-axis) and the surveyed female income share (on the y-axis). Overall, there
is a strong positive correlation between the surveyed and administrative female income
share.19 Couples where the woman outearns her partner based on administrative infor-
mation but who report that the woman earns less or the same as her partner are shown in
red, the opposite being true for couples in blue. We see that couples crossing the thresh-
old from above (red) are placed between 51 and 70 percent in the distribution of female
income shares based on administrative data and place themselves between the 20th and
the 50th percent bin when surveyed, with the majority repositioning themselves from the
range of 5 percent above 50 percent to the the five percent just below.
The number of couples crossing the threshold is visualized in Figure 4. The gray bars
in graph (a) show the distribution of surveyed female income shares. The red bars show
the number of couples in the survey distribution who cross the threshold from above and in
blue the individuals who cross the threshold from below. We see that there are many cou-
ples we termed norm-complying misreporters. In particular, about 40 percent of couples
in the bar just below the threshold are placed above in the administrative distribution.
This constitutes direct evidence that a considerable part of the excess mass just below
the threshold is driven by couples where the woman outearns her partner based on ad-
ministrative information. There are considerably fewer individuals who place the couple
above the threshold in the survey distribution and are placed below in the administrative
distribution, i.e., whose deviation between survey and administrative incomes leads them
to violate the norm (norm non-complying misreporters).
19This correlation is also visible when looking at individuals’ surveyed and administrative incomes, as
shown in Figure A.3 in the appendix. We see that individuals, on average, know what they and their
partner earn. This is true for female and male respondents alike. The correlation between administrative
and surveyed incomes is reasonably high at 0.93 for female respondents and their own income and 0.87
for female respondents and their partner’s incomes. The same numbers for male respondents are 0.92 for
their own and 0.92 for their partner’s income, respectively.
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Figure 3: Surveyed vs. admin. based female income shares. This figure shows the scatter plot
between the female income share resulting from survey data and from administrative data
respectively, and pooling male and female respondents. The red dots mark individuals who
cross the threshold from above (whose administrative female income share is above 50 percent
but the surveyed one lies below or equals 50 percent) and the blue dots mark those individuals
who crossed the threshold from below (whose administrative female income share is below or
equal to 50 percent but the surveyed one lies above).
It is important to note that the pattern cannot simply be explained by random devia-
tions in income reporting of one’s own or the partner’s income. Theoretically, if what we
observe were caused by random deviations, we would observe more norm non-complying
misreporters (in blue) than norm complying misreporters (in red), as the actual mass
below the threshold is considerably higher than the mass above. Figure 4 (b) visualizes a
simulated distribution of surveyed female income shares. It demonstrates what a distri-
bution of female income shares based on survey data would look like if deviations between
administrative and surveyed incomes were random.20 As expected, if misreporting were
random, there would be more norm non-complying misreporters in blue than norm com-
plying misreporters in red. This is confirmed when we repeat this random assignment of
deviations in surveyed incomes 1,000 times. We observe that 202 couples cross the thresh-
old, of which 61 couples (30.2%) cross from below and 141 couples (69.8%) from above. In
20More precisely, in order to determine the average deviation between surveyed and administrative
incomes for the simulation, we regress the deviation of surveyed and administrative incomes on admin-
istrative incomes and an indicator whether incomes are reported as gross or net (since this affects the
deviation). We then use each individual’s administrative incomes and add a random error to simulate
random reporting deviations. This error is drawn from a normal distribution with mean and standard de-
viation determined by mean misreporting of an individual for each income, determined by the regression
described before. We do this separately for men and women, as well as for their own and their partner’s
income.
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Conditioning on survey distribution
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Figure 4: Histograms visualizing the number of couples finding themselves on a different side
of the threshold when using survey vs. admin. data. In all four graphs, the red bars show the
number of couples where the woman outearns her partner based on administrative information
but earns less or the same based on survey information (norm complying misreporters). The
blue bars show the number of couples where the woman earns less or the same based on
administrative data and outearns the partner based on survey data (norm non-complying
misreporters). The four graphs differ regarding the underlying distribution. The distributions
are presented as raw histograms in 2 percent bins. The histogram in the first row and to the
left shows the distribution of surveyed female income shares and the histogram to the right
visualizes the distribution of income shares based on administrative data with random
misreporting (in gray). The histograms in the second row show the distribution of
administrative income shares.
the simulation, an average of 175.342 couples cross the threshold, of which 125.736 couples
(72%) cross from below and only 49.606 couples (28%) cross from above. Consequently,
in our sample, the number of individuals who place themselves below instead of above
the threshold is disproportionately higher, alleviating any concerns that the pattern we
observe could be driven by random reporting errors. This again leaves systematic reposi-
tioning of couples where the woman outearns the man to below the threshold as the most
likely explanation.
Figure 4 (c) shows the same point, this time conditioning on the administrative female
income share. Conditioning on the administrative female income share allows us to see
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where norm complying misreporters and norm non-complying misreporters originate. The
gray bars show the distribution of the administrative income share. The red bars show
the number of couples for which the respondent reports a female income share below
the threshold in the survey and their position in the administrative distribution (norm
complying misreporters in red). As shown above, their administrative female income
shares are mainly between the 51 and the 60 percent bin. There are much fewer couples
for which the respondent reports a female income share above 50 percent and whose
administrative female income share lies below (blue). As before Figure 4 (d) visualizes
the equivalent if there were a random reporting error. Again, we see that if the reporting
error were random we would observe only few couples who report to have an income share
below 50 percent and whose administrative female income share is above, while we would
observe more norm non-complying misreporters in blue. This clearly shows that there is
a systematic repositioning of couples from above to below the threshold.
In what follows, we study the shift from above 50 percent in the administrative income
share to below or equal to 50 percent in the surveyed distribution of income shares earned
by the woman in more detail. This analysis is based on the following equation:
yi = β1 × 1[RIadmini ≤ 40] +
∑29
k=21 βk × 1[(2k − 2) < RIadmini ≤ 2k]
+β30 × 1[58 < RIadmini ] + ρ×modei + ui, (1)
where yi describes the outcome variable, which is either the reporting difference in the fe-
male income share (surveyed female inc. share - admin. female inc. share ) or the income
deviation (Δy =(survey inc.- admin. inc.)/admin inc.). The estimates of βk therefore
estimate the average in outcome y for each bin of the distribution of the administrative
female income share (RIadmin), controlling for the mode income is reported in (mode)
which can either be monthly gross, monthly net, or yearly gross. Two percent bins are
included for the range between 40 and 58 percent, while the observations below 40 and
those above 58 percent are grouped in wider bins.
We further interact the bins above 50 percent with an indicator taking value 1 when
couples have an administrative relative income share above 50 percent and a surveyed
relative income share below or equal to 50 percent (norm compl. mirep.), which allows us
to distinguish between the behavior of norm complying misreporters and norm violators.
We do this using the following equation:
yi = β1 × 1[RIadmini ≤ 40] +
∑29
k=21 βk × 1[(2k − 2) < RIadmini ≤ 2k]
+β30 × 1[58 < RIadmini ]
+
¶∑29
k=26 γk × 1[(2k − 2) < RIadmini ≤ 2k] + β30 × 1[58 < RIadmini ]
©
×1[norm compl. mirep.i] + ρ×modei + ui (2)
The coefficients γk therefore indicate the average differential between norm complying
misreporters and norm violators for the respective bin.
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Figure 5: Deviation between the surveyed and administrative income share for bins of the
distribution of administrative income shares earned by the woman. The estimates are based on
regressing the deviation between the administrative and survey income share on bins of the
administrative distribution and an indicator for the income response mode. For the bins above
50 percent of the administrative distribution, we additionally interact the indicator for the bin
with an indicator for norm complying misreporters, i.e., for couples above 50 percent in the
distribution based on administrative data but with a female income share below or equal to 50
percent in the distribution based on survey data (see, Eq. 2).
Figure 5 visualizes individuals’ deviations between the surveyed and the administrative
female income share conditioning on the position in the administrative distribution. Up
to a female income share of 40 percent, there is on average no deviation between the
surveyed and the administrative female income share of a couple. After that, we find
a visible decrease in the surveyed income share compared to the administrative income
share, indicating that individuals start to underreport female incomes and/or overreport
male incomes in surveys. This deviation increases for couples just below the threshold
and continues to increase for couples where the woman outearns her partner based on
administrative data. More specifically, norm complying misreporters, i.e., individuals
who cross the threshold from above by their survey response, systematically underreport
their female income share compared to other individuals in the same bin.
The observation that the deviation is already negative in the bins just below the
50 percent threshold indicates that couples where the woman earns less or the same as
her partner but who are close to the 50 percent threshold already start to underreport
their income share in surveys, which speaks against an equality norm argument. Such
an equality norm would state that a couple’s goal is to state equal earnings in surveys.21
21Even if we focus only on norm complying misreporters, only about 35% percent report equal earnings.
Equality is thus not the main driver behind our findings.
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This observation indicates that individuals just below the threshold preventively react to
the norm and start to adapt their income reporting such that they do not violate the male
breadwinner norm. For norm violators, i.e., couples where the woman earns more and
who report this as such, we see two slightly positive estimates for the first two bins above
the threshold. This indicates a slight overreporting of the female income share. While it
is orders of magnitudes smaller than the underreporting of those who cross the threshold
from above, it still might indicate that individuals who are willing to violate traditional
gender norms are more conscious about the female income share and want to prevent the
situation from being misrepresented.
In a next step, we want to shed light on how specifically respondents misreport and
achieve this systematic repositioning from above to below the threshold. In principle,
there are three possible ways: One can either misreport one’s own or one’s partner’s
income or both.
In order to see which strategy is applied when it comes to income reporting, we analyze
the average deviation between surveyed and administrative incomes of couples above 50
percent of the administrative distribution of female income shares. For bins spanning 2
percent, we calculate the average deviation of norm violators (couples where the woman
earns more and who report this as such) and norm complying misreporters (couples where
the woman earns more who, however, report that she earns less) controlling for the income
response mode (see Equation 2 for the full specification).
Figure 6 visualizes the excess deviation of norm complying misreporters (the excess
income deviation compared to other individuals in the same bin, estimated by γˆk). The
first row shows misreporting conditioning on administrative income shares. Panel a)
shows that female respondents who cross the threshold from above underreport their own
income (negative values, black dots) and simultaneously overreport the income of their
partner (positive values, gray diamonds) compared to the average individual in the bin.
The size of misreporting increases in absolute terms in the position in the distribution of
administrative income shares: the farther above, the higher the required misreporting to
conform with the norm.
We see a consistent picture for male respondents in panel b). Male norm complying
misreporters overreport their own income and underreport the income of their partner.
Consequently, both own and partner incomes are misreported in order to comply with
traditional gender norms. For both male and female respondents, overreporting of male
incomes seems to be clearer and more systematic.
The second row in Figure 6 shows another perspective on misreporting of norm-
complying misreporters, this time conditioning on the reported position in the surveyed
female income share and thus using norm compliers as the reference group. We see that
female respondents who place themselves just below the threshold (in the range between
48 and 50 percent), underreport their own and overreport their partner’s income system-
atically, but only to a small extent. The further below respondents place themselves in
the surveyed distribution, the larger misreporting becomes. The picture for male respon-
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Figure 6: The upper panel shows excess misreporting of norm complying misreporters
compared to other individuals in the same bin, conditional on the administrative distribution
for women and men. It shows for each bin whether individuals misreport their own or their
partner’s income to fall below the 50 percent threshold. The lower panel shows misreporting
conditional on the survey distribution for women and men. It shows for each bin whether
individuals sorting themselves to the specific bin do this by misreporting their own or their
partner’s income.
dents in panel d) shows a analogous picture. They underreport their partner’s income
and overreport their own incomes. Many individuals choose to place themselves just be-
low the threshold, contributing to the narrow confidence bands in the bin just below the
threshold. While Figure 6 presents the estimated differentials, Figures A.4 and A.5 in the
appendix show the respective level estimates.
Before, we have seen that couples where the women earns a similar amount or slightly
less than her partner already start misreporting their income share. Figure A.4 in the
Appendix shows the level estimates of their income misreporting of own and partner in-
comes. This slight precautionary misreporting seems to mostly be driven by overreporting
(female respondents) or underreporting (male respondents) their partner’s incomes. This
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implies that there is already a slight bias in respondents’ surveyed incomes for couples
which fall below the 50 percent margin in administrative income shares and further, that
the norm seems to even be salient for individuals who, in actual terms. conform. Ad-
ditionally, this precautionary misreporting confirms that what we see is not driven by a
pursuit of income equality within the couple but that it is very one-dimensional, raising
male incomes and depressing female incomes.
We document that in our data, the entirety of the discontinuity at the point where the
woman would outearn her partner observed in survey data is explained by misreporting
of own and partner incomes. This, however, might not necessarily be fully applicable to
other countries. In Switzerland, there is, for instance, no particular tradition of collective
wage agreements applying to whole sectors and there is no general minimum wage. This
makes it less likely for couples to earn the exact same income, even if working in the same
sector. Additionally, married couples are taxed jointly and there is no tax incentive to
equalize earnings. There are thus good reasons to expect that some spike due to responses
to institutional incentives would persist in other countries.
Nevertheless, our results stress that studies investigating this very phenomenon in
survey data capture systematic income misreporting to a large extent. This misreporting
is indeed driven by gender norms. It does, however, not seem to affect real labor market
decisions.
3.3 Descriptive evidence on norm-complying misreporters
In this section we present descriptively the characteristics correlated with being a norm-
complying misreporter. Figure 7 shows how, on average, norm-complying misreporters
differ from norm violators. We focus on couples where based on administrative data, the
woman earns more than her partner. The distinction between norm complying misre-
porters and norm violators shows what characteristics are correlated with respondents re-
porting incomes in surveys which lead to a surveyed female income share below the thresh-
old compared to couples reporting incomes such that they remain above the threshold.
Panel a) presents the comparison of socio-demographics. Norm complying misreporters
do not differ from norm violators when it comes to the average age of the man, the woman,
nor the average household income. While there is no difference in the probability that
the man in the couple has tertiary education, women in couples that place themselves
below the 50 percent threshold in surveys are less likely to hold tertiary education. We
find that norm complying miserporters are neither more nor less likely to have children.
Except for the observation that couples where the woman is highly educated are less
likely to misreport, norm complying misreporters and norm violators seem not to differ
systematically.
Panel b) shows a comparison of observable characteristics known to be correlated with
gender norms to proxy groups we expect to be more traditional and test whether these
groups are indeed more likely to be norm complying misreporters. In a first step, we
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Figure 7: Average comparison between norm complying misreporters and norm violators.
This Figure shows the difference in the group averages between norm violators (admin. female
income share > 50 percent, surveyed female income share > 50 percent) and norm complying
misreporters (compliers, admin. female income share > 50 percent, surveyed female income
share ≤ 50 percent) for different characteristics. The estimates only include individuals with an
administrative female income share above 50 percent. Panel a) presents the comparison of
sociodemographic characteristics and panel b) the comparison of observables known to be
correlated with traditional gender norms. We pool the data for male and female respondents
and report 90 percent confidence bounds. The corresponding estimates can be found in Tables
A.5 and A.6. Hrs. stands for weekly work hours. Age diff. describes the within-couple age
difference defined as (agem − agew). German speaking describes an indicator set to one for
German speaking individuals (in relation to French, Italian, or Romansh speaking). Unequal
country describes an indicator set to one for individuals with origins in a country with more
traditional gender norms.
try to capture situations which would jeopardize the status of a man holding traditional
gender norms in a relationship. This approach is based on the findings of Fisman et al.
(2006) and Bursztyn et al. (2017), who document that men consider women less attractive
if the woman’s ambitions exceed their own.22 The first measure we employ is the relative
education within a couple. The idea is that it might be perceived as fair if the women
earns more if she is also more educated than the man. A situation where the woman
outearns her partner and is equally or less educated might, however, provoke discomfort
and be a threat to the male identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). We test for a difference
in the probability that a norm complying misreporter is part of a couple where the man is
equally or more educated and is still outearned by the woman, and find that these couples
are more likely to be norm complying misreporters. Or to put it differently, the share
of couples where the woman is less or equally educated is 15 percentage points higher
in the group of norm complying misreporters when compared to norm violators. The
difference amounts to about 20 percent of the sample average (76 percent). This evidence
is in line with the idea that situations which might be a threat to the male breadwinner
identity provoke misreporting. Another situation, which could produce similar unease
22It is further in line with social structure theory (Eagly and Wood, 1999).
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is when the woman works the same or fewer hours per week as her partner but earns
more. Considering this measure, we find that couples where the woman works fewer or
the same hours are systematically more likely to misreport (the difference amounts to
about 10 percent of the sample average). These findings suggest that situations which
jeopardize the male position within the relationship (or the male identity) seem to be a
good predictor for norm-complying misreporting.
In a next step, we analyze direct proxies of traditional gender norms known in the
literature. First, we exploit a proxy which we observe for all couples in the sample.
Following Folke and Rickne (2018), we use the within-couple age difference as a proxy of an
individual’s gender norms when entering the relationship. Couples where the man is older
than the woman are assumed to be, on average, more compliant with traditional gender
norms.23 Consistently we observe that the within-couple age difference is on average higher
in misreporting couples (the difference amounts to 35 percent of the sample average).
Second, we use the language the survey interview was conducted in as an approxi-
mation of gender norms. Prior studies have shown that individuals in German speaking
areas of Switzerland hold more traditional gender norms than individuals in the other
language regions (Italian, French, and Romansh) (see, e.g., Steinhauer, 2013). We would
thus expect that norm-complying misreporters are more likely to speak German than
one of the other languages. This is what we find. Misreporters seem to be on average
more likely to be German speaking. While the difference is not significant at any of the
conventional levels, it amounts to about 9 percent of the sample average.
As a final norm proxy, we use cultural norms in the countries of origin of migrants to
approximate individuals who we expect to hold more traditional gernder norms. We ex-
ploit the fact that Switzerland has a comparatively high share of immigrants and apply the
epidemiological approach suggested in Fernández and Fogli (2009). We approximate an
individual’s norms by gender norms in the country of their ancestry. The basic idea is that
individuals take part of the culture (through socialization) with them when emigrating.
These norms are to some extent also transmitted intergenerationally. As these individ-
uals live and partly grow up in the same country and institutional setting, differences
in their behavior should emerge through these transmitted gender norms. Traditional
gender norms are proxied by average agreement of all employed women in a country with
the statement “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”,
as measured in the WVS. Splitting countries at the sample median, we define two types
of origin countries: countries where average agreement is lower, which we would expect
to hold less traditional gender norms, and countries where agreement is higher, which we
expect to hold more traditional gender norms.24 The difference for the likelihood that
a norm complying misreporter originates from a more gender traditional country is not
statistically significant at conventional levels. However, the sample is of course quite small
23In our sample, men are at the median two years older than their partner.
24Detailed information on how we determine an individual’s ancestry and the definition of equal and
unequal countries can be found in Section A.3 of Appendix 2.
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(about 25 percent of the original sample). Still the difference is considerable. Given a
baseline probability of 30 percent to be from a country with traditional gender norms,
norm complyiers are about 9 percentage points more likely to originate from more tradi-
tional countries, which amounts to about 30 percent of the sample mean.25 Summing up,
measures of traditional gender norms seem to be good predictors for individuals’ misre-
porting behavior, strengthening the interpretation that individuals self-conceptions and
norms are the drivers of such behavior.
4 Discussion
Our evidence strikingly demonstrates that gender norms play an important role in indi-
viduals’ responses to surveys and can lead to systematic misreporting. In this section,
we demonstrate that the survey bias might also translate into a systematic bias in policy
relevant measures frequently studied by economists and social scientists.
Due to a lack of high quality administrative data, social scientists have long been con-
fined to survey data for their analyses. Furthermore, survey data often include information
on topics such as voting behavior, division of family responsibilities, or employment in the
informal sector, which cannot be elicited from administrative sources. It is all the more
important for researchers to be aware of potential biases in survey information. This is
relevant in individuals’ responses regarding their own characteristics, but might be even
more pronounced when proxy responses are used. Proxy interviews are frequently used
to reduce survey costs and might lead to biased information, as pointed out by Reynolds
and Wenger (2012) and Lee and Lee (2012). In 2009, for example, almost half of the labor
force data in the Current Population Survey (CPS) are provided by proxy respondents
(Reynolds and Wenger, 2012).26 Particularly for information on sensitive topics or ques-
tions prone to the influence of norms, survey data may be considerably biased. According
to our evidence this is a problem that concerns both information from interviews with the
target person directly and proxy interviews (individuals’ responses about their partner).
Our data offers the unique opportunity to assess how strongly the use of survey data
and proxy interviews could bias, for example, estimates of the gender wage gap (GWG).
In particular, we assess the bias in a sample for which we observe equally many women
and men and in which the selection into response by gender does not play a role as the
reporting person within the household is randomly chosen.
We start by calculating the true GWG based on administrative information for the
respondents. In particular, we regress log hourly incomes on gender, controlling for the
25The fact that in only 30 percent of couples where the woman outearns her partner based on admin-
istrative data, the respondent is from an unequal country serves as additional indication that a couple’s
relative income share is related to gender norms. Based on the fact that we use the within sample me-
dian to split countries into equal and unequal, this number would be 50 percent if couples were equally
distributed across relative income shares.
26The CPS is one of the most frequently used US surveys in economics. Among other things, many
studies on the GWG (see, e.g., Blau and Kahn, 2000, 1997; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Macpherson and
Hirsch, 1995) rely on CPS data.
21
Table 1: Gender wage gaps
GWG admin. GWG survey GWG admin. GWG survey
including partner with proxies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.149*** -0.163*** -0.171*** -0.194***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Net Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,078 3,078 6,071 6,071
R-squared 0.306 0.394 0.276 0.325
Notes: OLS estimates of the gender wage gap regressing log hourly income on indicator variables for
female, education, and if income is reported as net, a continuous age variable and a constant. The four
specifications distinguish between the data source (survey or admin.) and whether proxy incomes are
used for the estimation. We loose some observations due to missing values in education of the respondent
or the partner. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
level of education, individuals’ age as well as the mode of the income response. This
results in a GWG of 14.9 percent (see Table 1 column (1)). In a next step, we asses
the GWG estimate based on surveyed incomes for the very same sample of individuals.
As seen before, there is some misreporting just below the threshold and systematic and
pronounced misreporting of norm complying misreporters and their own incomes above
the threshold. Based on surveyed incomes, the GWG amounts to 16.3 percent (see Table
1 column (2)) and is thus overestimated by about 9.4 percent.
In a next step, we mimic the data structure of surveys with proxy information (like
the CPS) and include administrative information on the respondent and the partner as
independent observations. This naturally almost doubles the number of observations.27
Based on this sample, we find a true (administrative) GWG of 17.1 percent.28 In column
(4), proxy income information is included, i.e., for each individual, we use both their own
reported income, as well as the income they report for their partner as our data base; just
like it is done in the CPS data. Based on the proxy information, the GWG now amounts
to 19.4 percent (see Table 1 (4)), which overestimates the true GWG in the administrative
data by about 13.5 percent and thus introduces a considerable bias. Both comparisons of
the administrative and survey GWG differ significantly at the 10 percent level.
This additional analysis strikingly shows that the misreporting of incomes in surveys
due to gender norms can lead to considerable biases in estimates of gender differences. This
bias becomes more substantial if proxy information is used. The use of proxy interviews
27We loose some observations if there are missing values for the characteristics of the partner.
28In the survey, information on the partner’s weekly work hours is only given in classes of five hours,
ranging from 1 (0-5 hours) to 9 (more than 40 hours). However, we have the true weekly work hours for
the respondent. Based on the this information we impute the respective average hours per class.
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does not seem to be rare in datasets used by economists, which underscores the broader
relevance of our findings.
5 Conclusion
A growing literature in economics strives to understand whether gender norms and roles
drive economic agents’ behavior. Due to the lack of high quality administrative data,
survey data has been the main data basis available to learn about these questions for
a long time. If, however, gender norms strongly impact individuals’ response behavior,
survey information might be less informative about agents’ real choices than we thought.
Comparing surveyed and administrative outcomes, we demonstrate that individuals’
survey responses are strikingly prone to the influence of social norms. Drawing on prior
work by Bertrand et al. (2015), we introduce misreporting in survey data as an additional
explanation behind the debated mechanism driving the discontinuity in the distribution
of female income shares at the point where the woman outearns her partner.
In particular, we draw on a unique dataset available for Switzerland, which combines
surveyed and administrative information for the same individual. We document that the
distinct discontinuity in the distribution of female income shares in survey data is indeed
driven by gender norms, which materialize in systematic income misreporting of couples
where the woman earns more than her partner. There is, however, no clear indication of
real labor market responses around the same margin. We substantiate our findings by
demonstrating that the GWG, a policy relevant measure frequently retrieved from survey
data, is vastly overestimated in survey data and even stronger if we were to use proxy
information, a standard practice in many population surveys.
Data Statement
The confidential individual-level data (SESAM) were obtained under contract Nr. 180262
from the Swiss Statistical Office. The data from the Swiss Structural Survey (Struk-
turerhebung) were obtained under contract Nr. 170334. Access is granted for scientific
research projects after review of a detailed application.29
29See https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/erhebungen/sesam.html
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A Appendix
A.1 Data
A.2 Administrative data on the total population
In one additional sub-analysis, we assess whether the overall administrative distribution
of female income shares also exhibits a discontinuity at the 50 percent margin as well as
a spike at exactly 50 percent for the universe of Swiss couples. To this end, we draw on
administrative information for all households in Switzerland for the years 2010 to 2014.30
The data do not include an identifier for the spouse. However, the fact that we observe
a household identifier, the marital status, and the date the marital status last changed
allows us to get a close approximation of couples. We define individuals to be a married
couple if they live in the same household (same address) and share the same date of
change of marital status.31 This should render a good approximation as it is unlikely that
two married individuals live in the same household and share the same wedding date, but
are not married to each other. The resulting within-couple age difference is similar in
the survey and the administrative data. Men are on average about two years older than
their wife. This supports our approach of matching spouses. We restrict the sample to
Swiss citizens and individuals holding a permanent residence permit and who are aged
between 18 and below 65 in order to match the sample used for the main analysis. We
further exclude all self-employed. The income measure we use is the raw sum of gross
incomes of an individual across all occupations in one year. This allows us to compute the
administrative income share of a married woman within a couple for the whole population.
A.3 Definition of an individual’s ancestry
In order to gain a comprehensive picture of individuals’ migration background, we exploit
information on the respondent’s nationality and their parents’ country of birth. Informa-
tion on the individuals’ nationality or their second nationality if they hold dual citizenship
(Swiss and any foreign country) have been part of the regular SAKE survey since 2003,
which means this information is available for all years we use for the analysis. We have
a sample of 664 individuals with information on migration background. The information
on an individual’s background is supplemented with data on norms persisting in their
country of ancestry, as reflected in the World Value Surveys.32 We use average approval
rates of full-time or part-time employed women with the statement “When jobs are scarce,
men should have more right to a job than women” as a measure of gender norms. Norms
30These data combine the population register (Statpop) with income data from the social security
register (ZAS by the Swiss Central Compensation Office). It was composed by Steiner and Wanner
(2015).
31The date of marital status in our data source is available for all individuals who have changed their
marital status within the last 40 years. We might thus lose observations of older cohorts. However, this
information was not centrally registered before. Furthermore, we restrict the data to households with no
more than 20 individuals to reduce the possible false positive rate.
32Data link: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.
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for the countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro and Central
Serbia are proxied by values for Serbia.33 Based on this information, we generate a binary
variable indicating whether an individual’s country of origin shows average approval rates
above or equal to the sample median (gender equal), or below the sample median (gender
unequal). This results in two types of origin countries:
• Equal countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Montenegro,
Netherlands, Peru, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United States
• Unequal countries: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, China, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Hungary, India, Japan, Kosovo,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovakia, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam
The within sample median is set by Germany (represents 28 percent of the sample)
where 12 percent of surveyed women who work either full- or part-time agree with the
statement that “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.”
The largest fraction of individuals with a background in a gender equal country is from
Italy (31 percent) and the largest fraction of individuals from a gender unequal country
is from France (11 percent).
33Country names defined by the BFS:
www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/grundlagen/stgb.assetdetail.6166613.html.
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A.4 Tables & Figures
Discontinuity in density estimates
In the following two tables with density discontinuity estimates following the empirical
likelihood-based test by Otsu et al. (2013), c refers to the threshold used (the lowest value
of female income shares exceeding 50 percent in order to only fit the density between
realized values), h refers to the bandwidth, fˆl reports the fit of the density coming from
the left and fˆr coming from the right respectively, θˆ is the estimate of the discontinuity,
lˆr is the value of the local likelihood ratio statistic under the null34, and fˆl/fˆr measures
the relative size of the discontinuity.
Table A.1: Density discontinuity estimates
c h fˆl fˆr θˆ lˆr fˆl/fˆr p-value N
Large sample:
Survey overall
(1) 50.0905 7 0.055 5 0.013 8 −0.041 7 332.475 6 4.033 5 0.000 0 13,068
Survey female
(2) 50.0905 7 0.063 9 0.016 2 −0.047 7 177.635 9 3.945 1 0.000 0 6,037
Survey male
(3) 50.0952 7 0.048 2 0.011 7 −0.036 5 153.526 5 4.116 9 0.000 0 7,031
Administrative overall
(4) 50.0007 7 0.013 6 0.010 6 −0.003 0 32.296 0 1.281 8 0.000 0 70,231
Small sample:
Survey overall
(5) 50.2203 7 0.048 1 0.015 6 −0.032 5 50.856 1 3.074 0 0.000 0 3,081
Administrative overall
(6) 50.0225 7 0.021 4 0.023 7 0.002 2 0.437 3 0.905 3 0.508 4 3,081
Notes: Rows (1) to (3) present local likelihood ratio results for the discontinuity in the distribution of
females’ surveyed income shares (based on SAKE survey years 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, and 2015). Row
(4) presents the discontinuity estimate in the distribution of administrative female income shares in the
full population of married couples which is described in Section A.2 of the appendix. Row (5) presents
the local likelihood ratio results for the survey information and row (6) for the administrative information
in our main sample including administrative and survey information for the very same couples (2012 and
2015). N stands for the number of observations with regard to the observations available for estimating
the whole density in the respective sample.
34The null hypothesis H0 : θ0 = θ for some θ can be tested by lr(θ) using χ2(1) critical values. We test
against H0 : θ0 = 0.
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Table A.2: Density discontinuity estimates, half of bandwidth
c h fˆl fˆr θˆ lˆr fˆl/fˆr p-value N
Large sample:
Survey overall
(1) 50.0905 3.5 0.116 1 0.012 3 −0.103 8 493.275 2 9.448 3 0.000 0 13,068
Survey female
(2) 50.0905 3.5 0.123 4 0.014 5 −0.108 9 244.763 8 8.526 5 0.000 0 6,037
Survey male
(3) 50.0952 3.5 0.111 3 0.010 5 −0.100 8 247.149 5 10.593 8 0.000 0 7,031
Administrative overall
(4) 50.0007 3.5 0.016 3 0.011 1 −0.005 2 41.225 7 1.473 0 0.000 0 70,231
Small sample:
Survey overall
(5) 50.2203 3.5 0.095 3 0.014 8 −0.080 5 78.057 2 6.421 8 0.000 0 3,081
Administrative overall
(6) 50.0225 3.5 0.020 7 0.023 9 0.003 2 0.485 5 0.865 7 0.485 9 3,081
Notes: Rows (1) to (3) present local likelihood ratio results for the discontinuity in the distribution of
females’ surveyed income shares (based on SAKE survey years 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, and 2015). Row
(4) presents the discontinuity estimate in the distribution of administrative female income shares in the
full population of married couples which is described in Section A.2 of the appendix. Row (5) presents
the local likelihood ratio results for the survey information and row (6) for the administrative information
in our main sample including administrative and survey information for the very same couples (2012 and
2015). N stands for the number of observations with regard to the observations available for estimating
the whole density in the respective sample.
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Figure A.1: Overall LLD fit of the income share earned by the woman in a couple separately
for female and male respondents. The solid line represents the LLD fit on both sides of the
threshold using a bandwidth of 7 percent. The shaded area represents the histogram of the
underlying data in 1 percent bins. The corresponding density discontinuity estimates can be
found in rows (2) and (3) of Table A.1.
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Figure A.2: Overall distribution of surveyed female income shares estimated using smoothed
binned counts as proposed in McCrary (2008). The smooth is a local linear smooth using a
triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 3.5%. The bin size is 1%. The automated procedure in
McCrary (2008) proposes a bin size of 0.262 and a bandwidth of 13.11. It renders a point
estimate of log difference in height of 0.556 with a p-value of 0.049. The manipulation test
provided in the rddensity package in STATA (Cattaneo et al., 2018) proposes an optimal
bandwidth of about 4 percent and also indicates a clear discontinuity with p-values<0.01.
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Figure A.3: Correlation between surveyed and administrative incomes for female and male
respondents and for their own and their partner’s income in the main sample. The dashed line
shows the 45◦ line where surveyed and administrative incomes coincide. The red dots mark
individuals who cross the threshold of just above 50 percent from above to conform with the
norm that the women should not earn more than her partner (norm complying misreporters).
For this correlation, we exclude 7 observations with monthly incomes of more than CHF 25,000
as these would distort this picture.
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Misreporting estimates
Table A.3: Misreporting estimates, conditional on admin. distribution
Dependent variable Diff. female inc. share Overreporting
(Survey inc.−Admin. inc.)
Female respondent Male respondent
Own inc. Partner inc. Own inc. Partner inc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
P(0,40] 0.960** 1.816 -2.594 -3.821*** 1.819
(0.433) (1.861) (1.662) (1.455) (2.563)
P(40,42] 0.422 -1.485 -3.040 -2.752 -1.928
(0.603) (2.619) (2.339) (1.996) (3.515)
P(42,44] -0.008 1.903 0.581 -0.765 -1.070
(0.613) (2.672) (2.386) (2.023) (3.562)
P(44,46] Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
P(46,48] -0.106 -2.502 1.088 -1.593 0.196
(0.604) (2.620) (2.340) (2.002) (3.526)
P(48,50] -1.597** -2.496 5.603** -2.263 -4.514
(0.627) (2.611) (2.332) (2.173) (3.827)
P(50,52] 2.480*** 2.723 -0.977 -6.616* 5.494
(0.907) (3.523) (3.146) (3.523) (6.203)
P(52,54] 3.005*** 1.874 -2.759 -7.735** 5.182
(0.843) (3.358) (2.999) (3.132) (5.514)
P(54,56] 0.511 -1.145 -0.846 -0.221 1.059
(0.994) (4.251) (3.796) (3.344) (5.887)
P(56,58] 0.131 -8.507 2.372 -13.944*** 1.130
(1.362) (5.267) (4.704) (5.295) (9.324)
P(58,60] -1.297** -4.523* 6.415*** -0.309 -2.443
(0.644) (2.556) (2.283) (2.449) (4.311)
P(50,52] × norm complying misrep. -5.169*** -7.455* 8.514** 8.986** -8.796
(1.022) (4.274) (3.817) (3.763) (6.626)
P(52,54] × norm complying misrep. -8.669*** -16.711*** 9.047* 14.682*** -10.216
(1.279) (5.714) (5.103) (4.271) (7.521)
P(54,56] × norm complying misrep. -12.145*** -10.173 35.350*** 13.565*** -21.210***
(1.475) (7.303) (6.523) (4.516) (7.952)
P(56,58] × norm complying misrep. -10.027*** -4.443 27.851*** 39.509*** -5.461
(1.970) (7.639) (6.822) (7.577) (13.342)
P(58,60] × norm complying misrep. -16.874*** -36.888*** 15.183* 23.868*** -22.407**
(1.848) (9.644) (8.614) (5.492) (9.670)
Constant -0.770* -10.289*** -12.735*** -7.556*** -14.538***
(0.425) (1.814) (1.621) (1.430) (2.519)
Inc. mode Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,081 1,415 1,415 1,666 1,666
R-squared 0.115 0.150 0.144 0.182 0.055
Notes: Misreporting of female income shares and incomes by bin of the admin. female income
share. We distinguish between misreporting of norm compliers (admin female inc. share ≤ 50
percent), norm violators (admin female inc. share > 50 percent, surveyed female inc. share >
50 percent), and norm complying misreporters (admin female inc. share > 50 percent, surveyed
female inc. share ≤ 50 percent). The interaction term between the bins above 50 percent and
the indicator for norm complying misreporters shows the additional deviation for this group. In
column (1), the dependent variable is the deviation in the female income share between survey and
admin. data (surveyed female inc. share - admin female inc. share). For columns (2) to (5), the
dependent variable is misreporting, as defined above. We use the specification described in Eq. 2
and standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Misreporting estimates, conditional on survey distribution
Dependent variable Diff. female inc. share Overreporting
(Survey inc.−Admin. inc.)
Female respondent Male respondent
Own inc. Partner inc. Own inc. Partner inc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
P(0,40] -2.499*** -1.158 0.989 1.732 -11.782***
(0.456) (2.027) (1.858) (1.553) (2.698)
P(40,42] -0.756 1.177 -1.320 0.941 -7.193*
(0.635) (2.851) (2.613) (2.137) (3.713)
P(42,44] -0.381 2.779 1.845 1.859 -0.407
(0.625) (2.788) (2.556) (2.112) (3.669)
P(44,46] Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
P(46,48] 0.193 3.037 0.729 -1.061 -4.136
(0.621) (2.638) (2.419) (2.235) (3.882)
P(48,50] 1.511** 3.824 -2.845 -0.786 1.510
(0.641) (2.678) (2.455) (2.375) (4.127)
P(50,52] -0.074 2.239 0.360 -1.354 -6.602
(0.747) (3.178) (2.913) (2.670) (4.639)
P(52,54] -1.216 -2.083 0.667 2.433 -6.512
(0.761) (3.199) (2.932) (2.762) (4.798)
P(54,56] -1.652** -2.274 6.876** 1.163 -1.472
(0.832) (3.401) (3.117) (3.165) (5.499)
P(56,58] -0.926 1.163 2.403 4.555 -8.792
(1.059) (4.052) (3.714) (4.653) (8.083)
P(58,60] 1.259* 0.441 -0.997 -3.917 -6.097
(0.679) (2.767) (2.537) (2.641) (4.589)
P(0,40] × norm complying misrep. -19.841*** -38.398*** 27.148*** 12.524*** -36.730***
(1.229) (5.794) (5.312) (3.956) (6.873)
P(40,42] × norm complying misrep. -17.456*** -47.065*** 2.148 66.176*** -13.343
(3.030) (16.442) (15.073) (8.926) (15.507)
P(42,44] × norm complying misrep. -11.140*** -20.157*** 21.889*** 13.629** -24.245***
(1.627) (7.569) (6.938) (5.294) (9.197)
P(44,46] × norm complying misrep. -10.193*** -18.059** 15.467** 32.336*** -10.206
(1.887) (8.381) (7.684) (6.405) (11.128)
P(46,48] × norm complying misrep. -7.592*** -6.950 16.815*** 16.541*** -14.160**
(1.241) (6.038) (5.535) (3.958) (6.877)
P(48,50] × norm complying misrep. -6.258*** -7.066** 15.026*** 8.049*** -13.894***
(0.742) (3.405) (3.121) (2.567) (4.460)
Constant 1.419*** -9.816*** -14.162*** -12.113*** -4.171
(0.448) (1.979) (1.814) (1.529) (2.656)
Inc. mode Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,081 1,415 1,415 1,666 1,666
R-squared 0.165 0.160 0.108 0.191 0.090
Notes: Misreporting of female income shares and incomes by bin of the surveyed female income
share. We distinguish between misreporting of norm compliers (admin female inc. share ≤ 50
percent), norm violators (admin female inc. share > 50 percent, surveyed female inc. share >
50 percent), and norm complying misreporters (admin female inc. share > 50 percent, surveyed
female inc. share ≤ 50 percent). The interaction term between the bins below 50 percent and
the indicator for norm complying misreporters shows the additional deviation for this group. In
column (1), the dependent variable is the deviation in the female income share between survey and
admin. data (surveyed female inc. share - admin female inc. share). For columns (2) to (5), the
dependent variable is misreporting, as defined above. We use the specification described in Eq. 2
and standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
34
Income deviation in own incomes, conditional on administrative income share
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Figure A.4: These graphs show the level estimates of the deviation between surveyed and
administrative incomes for norm compliers, norm violators, and norm complying misreporters
conditioning on the position in the administrative distribution of female income shares. The
upper panel shows the average deviations of own incomes for female (a) and male (b)
respondents. The lower panel shows the average deviations of partner incomes for female (c)
and male (d) respondents. 95 percent confidence bounds are displayed. We use the
specification described in Eq. 2.
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Income deviation in own incomes, conditional on surveyed income share
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Figure A.5: These graphs show the level estimates of the deviation between surveyed and
administrative incomes for norm compliers, norm violators, and norm complying misreporters
conditioning on the position in the survey distribution of female income shares. The upper
panel shows the average deviations of own incomes for female (a) and male (b) respondents.
The lower panel shows the average deviations of partner incomes for female (c) and male (d)
respondents. 95 percent confidence bounds are displayed. We use the specification described in
Eq. 2.
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Table A.5: Socio-demographic characteristics of couples where the woman outearns her
partner
Mean Mean violators Mean compliers Diff. SE diff. t-value p-value N
Age w / 10 3.97 3.97 3.97 -0.001 0.103 0.01 0.994 408
Age m / 10 4.21 4.18 4.26 0.080 0.109 -0.73 0.466 408
Inc. admin. hh 1.49 1.51 1.45 -0.056 0.069 0.80 0.423 408
Tert. educ. w 0.43 0.50 0.29 -0.205 0.051 4.03 0.000 405
Tert. educ. m 0.32 0.32 0.32 -0.003 0.049 0.06 0.950 405
Couple w/ children 0.37 0.38 0.35 -0.035 0.050 0.69 0.494 408
Notes: Descriptive statistics for couples where the woman outearns her partner in administrative terms,
distinguishing between norm violators (admin. female income share > 50 percent, surveyed female income
share > 50 percent) and norm complying misreporters (compliers, admin. female income share > 50
percent, surveyed female income share ≤ 50 percent).
Table A.6: Norm proxies of couples where the woman outearns her partner
Mean Mean violators Mean compliers Diff. SE diff. t-value p-value N
Educ. w ≤ educ. m 0.76 0.71 0.87 0.154 0.044 -3.52 0.000 408
Hrs. w ≤ hrs. m 0.81 0.78 0.87 0.081 0.041 -2.00 0.046 405
Age diff. / 10 0.23 0.21 0.29 0.081 0.049 -1.64 0.101 408
German speaking 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.063 0.048 -1.33 0.186 408
Unequal country 0.30 0.27 0.36 0.090 0.095 -0.95 0.346 106
Notes: Descriptive statistics of norm proxies for couples where the woman outearns her partner in
administrative terms, distinguishing between norm violators (admin. female income share > 50 percent,
surveyed female income share > 50 percent) and norm complying misreporters (compliers, admin. female
income share > 50 percent, surveyed female income share ≤ 50 percent). Hrs. stand for weekly work
hours. Age diff. describes the within-couple age difference defined as (agem − agew). German speaking
describes an indicator set to one for German speaking individuals (in relation to French, Italian, or
Romansh speaking). Unequal country describes an indicator set to one for individuals with origins in a
country with more traditional gender norms.
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A.5 Survey procedure and questions
The income components are surveyed as follows: Close to the end of the standard SAKE
questionnaire, the target person states her or his own income. Right after the standard
questionnaire concludes, the special questionnaire starts. Consecutively, the respondents
are asked whether they have a partner living in the same household. If yes, the follow up
questions are whether the partner is employed and what is her or his income. The question
about the partner’s income is asked in exactly the same way and with the same options
as the question about the target person’s income. Thus, it is always the respondent’s own
income that is surveyed first before the focus changes to the partner’s income. There are
only a few questions in between the one on one’s own and on the partner’s income. It can
thus be assumed that the respondent still has the response to the question about their
own income present when asked about the partner’s income.
77000 01
77000 02  Könnten Sie mir Ihren MONATSLOHN angeben ?
77000 03  Wenn's Ihnen leichter fällt, können Sie auch den Jahres- oder
77000 04  Stundenlohn angeben.
77000 05  ----------------------------------------------------------------------
77000 06
77000 07
77000 08        o LOHN .............................<*******>
77000 09        - Arbeitet ohne Entlöhnung .........<0>
77000 10        ---------------------------------------------
77000 11        - Weiss nicht ......................<X>
77000 12        - Keine Antwort ....................<Y>
77000 13
77000 14
77000 15                       *******
77001 01
Figure A.6: Survey question on personal income. Survey question 77000 (variable IW04) is
translated as: "Could you tell me your monthly salary? If it is easier for you, you may also tell
me your yearly or hourly salary." There are four response options: 1. Salary (numeric) 2.
Works without compensation 3. Don’t know 4. No answer
.
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77100 01
77100 02  ==> INT: Sind die angegebenen Fr. X ...
77100 03
77100 04  o BRUTTO (VOR Abzug der Sozialbeiträge):    - pro Monat .....<1>
77100 05                                              - pro Jahr ......<2>
77100 06                                              - pro Stunde ....<3>
77100 07  o NETTO (NACH Abzug der Sozialbeiträge):    - pro Monat .....<4>
77100 08                                              - pro Jahr ......<5>
77100 09                                              - pro Stunde ....<6>
77100 10
77100 11  o weiss nicht ...............................................<8>
77100 12  o keine Antwort .............................................<9>
77100 13  o der angegebene Betrag von Fr. X ist falsch .......<0>
77100 14
77100 15
Figure A.7: Survey question on mode of income declaration. Survey question 77004 asks
whether the reported income is net or gross; hourly, monthly, or yearly. The exact question is
"Is the declared amount CHF X: 1. Gross (per month / per year / per hour), 2. Net (per
month / per year / per hour)". Additional answer options are "3. "I don’t know" 4. No answer
5. "The above amount of CHF X is wrong."
77900 01 Sie haben mir vorher gesagt, dass Ihre Ehe-/Lebenspartnerin
77900 02 erwerbstätig ist. Könnten Sie mir den MONATSLOHN von Ihrer Ehe-/
77900 03 Lebenspartnerin angeben?
77900 04 Wenn's Ihnen leichter fällt, können Sie auch den Jahres- oder
77900 05 Stundenlohn angeben.
77900 06 ------------------------------------------------------------------------
77900 07
77900 08
77900 09
77900 10       o MONATSLOHN ........................ <********>
77900 11       o Arbeitet ohne Entlöhnung .......... <0>
77900 12       ----------------------------------------------
77900 13       - Weiss nicht ....................... <X>
77900 14       - Keine Antwort ..................... <Y>
77900 15                       ********
Figure A.8: Survey question that defines the partner’s income. Survey question 77900
(variable IW20) is translated as: "You have told me before that your spouse / partner is
employed. Could you tell me the monthly salary of your spouse / partner? If it is easier for
you, you may also tell me his / her yearly or hourly salary." There are four response options: 1.
Salary (numeric) 2. Works without compensation 3. Don’t know 4. No answer
.
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77950 01
77950 02 Sind die angegebenen#bFr. X.-#e...
77950 03
77950 04 o BRUTTO (VOR Abzug der Sozialbeiträge):    - pro Monat .....<1>
77950 05                                             - pro Jahr ......<2>
77950 06                                             - pro Stunde ....<3>
77950 07 o NETTO (NACH Abzug der Sozialbeiträge):    - pro Monat .....<4>
77950 08                                             - pro Jahr ......<5>
77950 09                                             - pro Stunde ....<6>
77950 10
77950 11 o weiss nicht ...............................................<8>
77950 12 o keine Antwort .............................................<9>
77950 13 o der angegebene Betrag von Fr. X ist falsch ...........<0>
77950 14
77950 15                                                                FORMAT !
Figure A.9: Survey question that specifies the mode of the income declaration for the
partner’s income. Survey question 77950 asks whether the reported partner income is net or
gross; hourly, monthly, or yearly. The exact question is "Is the declared amount CHF X: 1.
Gross (per month / per year / per hour), 2. Net (per month / per year / per hour)".
Additional answer options are "3. "I don’t know" 4. No answer 5. "The above amount of CHF
X is wrong."
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